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Perry A. Zirkel
I. INTRODUCTION
An interrelated pair of procedures that have come into favor in the
field of special education for proactively addressing the behavior problems of students with disabilities—which range from violence to self or
others to extreme introversion or inattention—are functional behavior
assessments (FBAs) and behavior intervention plans (BIPs). An FBA is a
systematic process of identifying the purpose—and more specifically the
function—of problem behaviors by investigating the preexisting environmental factors that have served the purpose of these behaviors.1 Based
on the foundation provided by FBAs, a BIP is a concrete plan of action
for reducing problem behaviors, dictated by the particular needs of the
student exhibiting the behaviors. 2 Special education experts regard an
FBA as inseparable from an effective, relevant, and efficient BIP.3
The principal legal framework for providing special education generally, and FBAs and BIPs specifically, for students with disabilities is
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).4 The IDEA re
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1. See generally Gregory P. Hanley et al., Functional Analysis of Problem Behavior: A Review,
36 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 147 (2003); Mark W. Steege & T. Steuart Watson, Best Practices
in Functional Behavior Assessment, in BEST PRACTICES IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY V 337 (Alex
Thomas & Jeff Grimes eds., 2008).
2. See generally Rutherford Turnbull, III et al., Public Policy Foundations for Positive Behavioral Interventions, Strategies, and Supports, 2 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 218 (2000).
3. E.g., George Sugai et al., Applying Positive Behavior Support and Functional Behavioral
Assessments in Schools, 23 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 131 (2000); Turnbull et al., supra
note 2, at 220; T. Steuart Watson et al., Teacher-Implemented Functional Analysis and Treatment: A
Method for Linking Assessment to Intervention, 28 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 292, 293–94 (1999).
4. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1450 (2008). The IDEA
regulations are at 34 C.F.R. pt., 300. The overlapping secondary statutory and regulatory framework
at the federal level consists of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS (3d ed. 2011).
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quires school districts to provide each “child with disability”5 with “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE)6 via an individualized education
program (IEP) 7 in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). 8 The Act
includes detailed provisions for the content specifications for IEPs9 and
for the procedural protections for disciplinary changes in placement. 10
Each state educational agency (SEA) receives and distributes funding
available under the IDEA and is responsible for monitoring compliance
with the Act’s various requirements.11 The IDEA’s primary dispute resolution mechanism is adjudicative, starting at the administrative level with
an impartial hearing officer and, in states that opt for a second administrative tier, a review officer.12 Federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction under the IDEA for judicial review of hearing officer decisions and, if applicable, review officer decisions.13
In its landmark decision under the IDEA, Board of Education v.
Rowley,14 the Supreme Court interpreted the original version of the IDEA
to provide for a two-pronged standard of FAPE. Viewing Congress as
emphasizing access via procedures, the Court concluded that the purpose
of the legislation was to “open the door”15 rather than to provide a high
substantive floor. Thus, the Rowley Court concluded that the standards
for FAPE were the following: (1) did the district comply with the various
applicable procedures, and (2) is the IEP “reasonably calculated to ena5. 20 U.S.C. § 1402(3).
6. Id. §§ 1402(9), 1412(a)(1).
7. Id. §§ 1402(9) & (14), 1412(d).
8. Id. § 1412(a)(5). The LRE requires placement within the range of placement options that,
with supplementary aids and services, provide interaction with nondisabled students to the maximum
extent appropriate. Thus, although associated with the concept of mainstreaming or inclusion,
LRE—via its reference to appropriateness and its interrelationship with FAPE—does not mean
placement of every child with a disability in the regular classroom.
9. Id. § 1412(d)(1)(A).
10. Id. § 1415(k)(1). Disciplinary changes in placement under the Act are removals—typically
referred to by schools as “suspensions” or “expulsions”—that exceed ten school days. Id.
§ 1415(k)(1)(B). For the distinction between consecutive and cumulative days within a school year,
see infra note 78.
11. E.g., id. § 1412(a).
12. Id. § 1415(f)–(g). For a current snapshot of the state one- and two-tier systems under the
IDEA, see Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA: A State-byState Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2009). For trends in the frequency of hearings under
the IDEA, see Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22 (2008). For an overview of the
alternate IDEA mechanism of the state complaint resolution system and the overlapping dispute
resolution avenues under Section 504 and the ADA, see Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A
Roadmap of Legal Dispute Resolution for Students with Disabilities, 23 J. SPECIAL EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 100 (2010).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).
14. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
15. Id. at 192.
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ble the child to receive educational benefits?”16 The substantive standard
was relatively low; indeed, as the dissent pointed out,17 a district could
apparently meet the standard by providing a teacher with a loud voice to
Amy Rowley, whose disability was deafness. In the intervening years
since Rowley, the Supreme Court has addressed various other IDEA issues, but not FBAs or BIPs,18 and Congress has codified a modified procedural standard for FAPE.19
The special education literature on FBAs and BIPs is full of rhetoric, research, and increasingly more detailed practical sources, but the legal literature specific to FBAs and BIPs is much more limited in both
quantity and quality. Both of these intersecting literature streams reflect
a notable misunderstanding of the legal requirements for FBAs and BIPs
(i.e., the minimum that must be done) and fail to differentiate professional best practice (i.e., the optimum amount to do).20 Moreover, a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the case law is missing.
This Article fills this gap by providing an empirical analysis of
IDEA case law after reviewing the legal literature on FBAs and BIPs and
synthesizing the legal framework of the IDEA. I propose that such a systematic synthesis offers two separable and parallel contributions to the
field of special education. First, it shows practitioners and researchers in
the field of special education the significant difference between the
“should” of their professional norms and the “must” of the IDEA’s legal
requirements. Second, it informs adjudicators and policymakers in special education law of the need for more consistent and well-conceived
legal standards for determining whether a student with disabilities is entitled to an FBA or a BIP and, if so, whether its contents and implementation are appropriate under the IDEA and its corollary state special education laws.
Part II of this Article provides a review of the literature concerning
FBAs and BIPs, with particular attention to legal analyses. Part III provides an overview of IDEA legislation and, in particular, the 1997 and
16. Id. at 206–07.
17. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
18. For an overview of most of these decisions, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, A Primer of Special
Education Law, 38 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 62 (2005).
19. Section 1415(f)(3)(E) of the IDEA provides the following:
In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a child did not
receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies—
(i) Impeded the child’s right to a FAPE;
(ii) Significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent’s child; or
(iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit.
20. E.g., Steege & Watson, supra note 1, at 344 (characterizing FBAs and BIPs as not only
legally required but also the best practice without any differentiation).
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2004 amendments that are specific to FBAs and BIPs. Part IV summarizes the method used for collecting and analyzing case law concerning
these two interrelated behavioral techniques under the IDEA. Part V provides the results of this empirical analysis, and Part VI provides a discussion of these results. Finally, Part VII concludes that there is a need for a
more consistent and coherent approach to the access, appropriateness,
and implementation of FBAs and BIPs under the IDEA.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Special Education Dimension
The perceived need for the FBA–BIP approach arose from the ineffectiveness of the early behavioral intervention approach, which had focused on imposing arbitrary consequential events upon the occurrence of
a problem behavior. 21 Subjective opinion often shaped the diagnostic
criteria used to determine the form of intervention—i.e., reinforcement or
punishment.22 This approach had several inherent shortcomings: (1) intervention often ignored an individual student’s needs by overly emphasizing the topography of problem behaviors rather than exploring their
triggers; (2) intervention success was temporary, as problem behaviors
reemerged due to the failure to address preexisting factors; and (3) intervention ineffectiveness often led to the use of more restrictive, more intrusive, and more punitive interventions.23
To overcome these limitations, researchers shifted the focus of their
conceptual discussion to the environmental factors surrounding problem
behavior. 24 The resulting empirical research revealed that the environmental factors serving the particular purpose and function of a problem
behavior maintained a topographically identical behavior.25 For example,
one student may exhibit aggression for the purpose of gaining a teacher’s
attention whereas another student may exhibit the same form of aggres21. E.g., Teodoro Ayllon & Jack Michael, The Psychiatric Nurse as Behavioral Engineer, 2 J.
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 323 (1959).
22. E.g., Steege & Watson, supra note 1, at 337–47.
23. E.g., Nathan H. Azrin, A Strategy for Applied Research, 32 AM. PSYCHOL. 140 (1977);
Donald M. Baer, A Fight of Behavior Analysis, 4 BEHAV. ANALYST 85 (1981); Samuel M. Dietz,
Current Status of Applied Behavior Analysis, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 805 (1978); Ruth A. Ervin et al.,
Reaffirming the Importance of Analysis in Applied Behavior Analysis: A Review of Functional Analysis of Problem Behavior, 34 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 255 (2001).
24. E.g., Donald M. Baer et al., Some Current Dimensions of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 91 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Edward G. Carr et al., Escape as a Factor in the Aggressive Behavior of Two
Retarded Children, 13 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 101 (1980); Marian Weeks & Robert GaylordRoss, Task Difficulty and Aberrant Behavior in Severely Handicapped Students, 14 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. ANALYSIS 449 (1981).
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sion to avoid difficult class instruction. The use of a detention room may
assuage the aggression for the first student and aggravate it for the
second student. Thus, these early studies illustrated the value of, and
prompted the need for, a procedure for identifying and assessing the
preexisting environmental factors that serve the purpose and function of
the problem behaviors.26
In the first comprehensive analysis of a general model of FBA–BIP
procedure, two separate teams of researchers developed and refined a
concurrent assessment of the occurrence of problem behaviors under
three to four test conditions containing different environmental factors,
such as amount of attention and difficulty of instruction.27 They found
that the occurrence of aggressive behaviors was higher under a particular
test condition, suggesting that the particular condition served the purpose
of the behaviors.28 Subsequent studies replicated and extended this FBA–
BIP procedure across a wide range of student populations, target behaviors, and educational environments, leading to the development of more
precise positive-reinforcement-based interventions and demonstrating an
apparent decrease in the use of overly restrictive, intrusive, and punitive
interventions.29 Further research efforts are in progress to refine an FBA–
BIP procedure that is more applicable to the school setting.30
Although research has not yet yielded one particular set of procedures as a proven best practice, special education experts recommend
FBAs as the foundational steps of a two-pronged strategy that should
include the following core components and culminate in a BIP: (1) operational definitions of problem behaviors; (2) descriptions of the assessment conditions that may reliably predict the occurrence and nonoccurrence of problem behaviors; (3) descriptions of the consequence events
that maintain problem behaviors; (4) direct observation of the problem

26. E.g., Hanley et al., supra note 1.
27. Edward G. Carr & V. Mark Durand, Reducing Behavior Problems Through Functional
Communication Training, 18 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 111 (1985); Brian A. Iwata et al., Toward a Functional Analysis of Self-Injury, 2 ANALYSIS & INTERVENTION IN DEV. DISABILITIES 3
(1982) (reprinted in 27 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 197 (1994)).
28. Carr & Durand, supra note 27, at 111; Iwata et al., supra note 27, at 3.
29. E.g., Craig H. Kennedy et al., Analyzing the Multiple Functions of Stereotypical Behavior
for Students with Autism, 33 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 559 (2000); Lillian Pelios et al., The
Impact of Functional Analysis Methodology on Treatment Choice for Self-Injurious and Aggressive
Behavior, 32 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 185 (1999).
30. E.g., James Fox & Carol Davis, Functional Behavior Assessment in Schools: Current Research Findings and Future Directions, 14 J. BEHAV. EDUC. 1 (2005); Steege & Watson, supra note
1.
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behaviors across the assessment conditions; and (5) a BIP based on the
analysis of this information.31
B. Legal Dimension
The legal literature addressing FBAs and BIPs is limited and, to a
notable extent, is neither sufficiently complete nor accurate. The first
legal analysis of FBAs or BIPs was a state-by-state survey study limited
to FBAs after their initial recognition in the 1997 amendments to the
IDEA.32 The National Association of State Directors of Special Education (NASDSE) provided a brief summary of the survey results from
“[forty-five responding] states and territories about policies, procedures
and guidelines related to . . . [FBAs].”33 Specifically, NASDSE reported
that, in the wake of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA and prior to the
1999 IDEA regulations, nineteen respondents had—and another thirtyfive respondents planned to revise or develop—written policies, procedures, or guidelines for FBAs. But the report did not provide any systematic information about the nineteen respondents in the first group, such
as which were states versus territories, what was the nature of their policies or guidance, and whether any of the policies, procedures, and guidance were legally binding (i.e., codified in state laws).34
Similarly, triggered by the initial express recognition of FBAs in
the IDEA, Professors Erik Drasgow and Mitchell Yell 35 followed an
overview of the 1997 amendments with an analysis of “due process hearings that directly involved FBAs from the time that IDEA 1997 became
law until August 2000.”36 Noting an absence of any published court decisions, they identified fourteen hearing officer decisions and reported that
the outcomes were in favor of the parents in thirteen (94%) of these nonjudicial decisions. Reflecting a professional inclination toward best practice instead of legal objectivity, Professors Drasgow and Yell concluded
that school districts conducting FBAs and developing BIPs in only the
31. Fox & Davis, supra note 30; Steege & Watson, supra note 1; Sugai et al., supra note 3;
Turnbull et al., supra note 2.
32. For the explicit recognition of FBAs and BIPs in the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, see
infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
33 . PROJECT FORUM AT NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE DIRECTORS OF SPECIAL EDUC., QTA,
FUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT STATE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1 (June 1998), http://
www.nasdse.org/Portals/0/Documents/Download Publications/PFR-808.pdf.
34. For the distinction and the need for differentiation in the field of special education, see,
e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Lisa B. Thomas, State Laws and Guidelines for Implementing RTI, 43
TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 60 (Sept./Oct. 2010).
35. Erik Drasgow & Mitchell L. Yell, Functional Behavioral Assessments: Legal Requirements
and Challenges, 30 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 239 (2001).
36. Id. at 246. “Due process hearings” in this context refers to the impartial hearings that are
the first tier of adjudication under the IDEA. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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limited circumstances prescribed in the IDEA “will probably not meet
IDEA ’97’s requirement to address problem behavior proactively.”37
The Drasgow–Yell analysis had several significant limitations.
First, it relied on an Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP)38 policy memorandum for its conclusion rather than on the legislation, regulations, and hearing officer decisions, and the policy memorandum did not
constitute a requirement.39 Second, the selection criteria for nonjudicial
decisions, which were limited to those addressing FBAs, were not sufficiently precise in terms of formulation and implementation. For example,
four of their fourteen decisions did not have an FBA issue, being limited
instead to a BIP.40 Similarly, at least as many of the selected decisions
were based on state law requirements that exceeded those of the IDEA.41
Additionally, although the article was premised on the 1997 IDEA
amendments, approximately half of the decisions arose prior to July 1,
1998, the date when the pertinent provisions became effective.42 Compounding these deficiencies, the sample of case law was too limited in
total number, adjudicative level, and time period to demonstrate weighty
legal trends. Finally, the ultimate analysis of the hearing officer decisions
was questionable. For example, the reported 94% parent-win rate did not
take into consideration other differences revealed by more refined out-

37. Id. at 250. In a separate article that did not include case law, Drasgow and Yell made clear
that they interpreted the 1997 amendments to the IDEA to require the development of FBAs and
BIPs not only for disciplinary changes in placement but also for students whose behavior impedes
their learning or the learning of others. Erik Drasgow et al., The IDEA Amendments of 1997: A
School-Wide Model for Conducting Functional Behavioral Assessments and Developing Behavior
Intervention Plans, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 244, 261–63 (1999).
38. OSEP is the unit in the U.S. Department of Education specifically responsible for administering the IDEA. See Welcome to OSEP!, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about
/offices/list/osers/osep/index.html (last visited July 18, 2011).
39. For a discussion of the nonbinding, although often persuasive, weight of OSEP’s policy
interpretations, see Perry A. Zirkel, Do OSEP Policy Letters Have Legal Weight?,171 EDUC. LAW
REP. 391 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR ¶ 216 (Iowa SEA 2000); Stroudsburg
Area Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 975 (Pa. SEA 1998); Devine Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 1238 (Tex.
SEA 1997).
41. See, e.g., Moorpark Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR ¶ 24 (Cal. SEA 1999); Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 2310, 29 IDELR 330 (Minn. SEA 1998); Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 320 (Pa. SEA
1998).
42. See, e.g., Bonita Unified Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 248 (Cal. SEA 1997); William S. Hart Sch.
Dist., 26 IDELR 1258 (Cal. SEA 1997); Devine Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 1238 (Tex. SEA 1997).
Additionally, contrary to their assertion of the absence of judicial authority, at least one of the fourteen cases was subject to a court decision during the time period for the case selection. See Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Jared M., 712 A.2d 807 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
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come scales43 and the dramatically different outcome pattern for IDEA
hearing and review officer decisions.44
Next, in 2006, a pair of articles that focused on BIPs highlighted
another limitation—confusing legal requirements regarding professional
recommendations—that resulted in an inaccurate legal analysis. In the
first of these two articles, Professor Susan Etscheidt provided detailed
methodological information explaining her identification of fifty-two
published decisions in LRP’s databases45 “in which the development of a
BIP was at issue” ranging from one in 1997 to two in 2005.46 Her analysis had three primary problems that lead to skewed results. First, she did
not adequately account for differences in legal weight of the decisions.
For example, in her tabulation, she relied on a hearing officer’s decision
in Illinois47 that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.48 Indeed,
in reversing the hearing officer’s decision, the Seventh Circuit expressly
rejected Etscheidt’s approach of “manufactur[ing] the substantive criteria
of a sufficient [BIP] based on a string of administrative opinions.” 49
Second, she did not take into account the difference between the IDEA
and more stringent state laws.50 Finally, and more significantly, she used
qualitative research techniques for content analysis thus failing to differentiate between the holding and the dicta in the various decisions.51 The

43. See, e.g., Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. LAW REP. 731 (2002).
45. LRP is the major specialized publisher for legal materials in special education. Its materials
include the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report, which is the hard-copy case compilation, and Special Ed Connection®, which is its electronic database. See LRP PUBLICATIONS,
http://www.lrp.com (last visited July 18, 2011).
46. Susan Etscheidt, Behavioral Intervention Plans: Pedagogical and Legal Analysis of Issues,
31 BEHAV. DISORDERS 223 (2006).
47. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 209 (Ill. SEA 2002).
48. Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004).
49. Id. In this context, the Seventh Circuit was referring to Professor Etscheidt’s role as an
IDEA hearing officer in an FBA–BIP decision on which the plaintiff–parent had relied.
50. Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for FBAs and BIPs, BEHAV. DISORDERS (forthcoming 2011).
51. For example, Etscheidt cited a Pennsylvania review officer’s decision to support the proposition that the purported appropriateness criterion for BIPs should be individualized, specifically
quoting the review officer as ruling that “the IEP team ‘did nothing to tailor the student’s [BIP] to
his individual needs.’” Etscheidt, supra note 46, at 230. But this quotation is from the publisher’s
abstract. In fact, the review officer affirmed the hearing officer’s LRE ruling with incidental commentary refusing to endorse a BIP that did not target alternative coping skills. Hempfield Sch. Dist.,
28 IDELR 509, 512 (Pa. SEA 1998). As another example, she cited a Maine hearing officer’s decision to support her appropriateness criterion that the BIP include positive behavior strategies. But the
hearing officer based this limited part of her denial of FAPE ruling on the lack of any BIP, not on the
absence of any positive behavior strategies. The comment about the use of abbreviated school days,
other than the conclusion that it constituted a denial of FAPE, merely hypothesized that it could have
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result was the subjective identification of best practice themes, such as
the notion that “a BIP must be developed if behavior is interfering with
learning.” 52 Consequently, Professor Etscheidt’s conclusions do not
square with the asserted legal support.53
In the other 2006 study, Professors John Maag and Antonis Katsiyannis appropriately started with best practice recommendations for
BIPs that were duly differentiated from the significantly lower IDEA
requirements. 54 But their subsequent “case law” analysis of ninety-six
“decisions” from 1997 to 2003 included numerous sources—twentyeight Office for Civil Rights (OCR)55 rulings and one OSEP policy letter—that were not adjudicative rulings. Additionally, the OCR letters of
findings and voluntary resolution agreements relied upon in the study do
not fall under the IDEA.56 Although the authors’ conclusions were more
balanced than those of Professor Etscheidt’s, they similarly did not include a comprehensive tabulation of the cases, including the legal bases
(e.g., IDEA or state law) and outcomes. Instead, they provided a brief
overview that compared selected case rulings to the related provisions of
IDEA 2004, which was not in effect at the time of those case rulings.
Finally, their resulting recommendations did not separate those that were
based on professional norms from those based on legal requirements.
Thus, their conclusions, including the assertion that legal precedent “has
established specific parameters”57 for BIPs, are clearly questionable.
More recently, in an analysis of the 1997 and 2004 IDEA amendments and court decisions concerning the general topic of discipline, retired principal Allan Osborne and Professor Charles Russo included a
section on FBAs and BIPs.58 Limiting their IDEA analysis to legislation,
they averred that “FBAs and BIPs are required whenever school officials

served as a positive incentive if there had been a BIP. Augusta Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 229, 1001
(Me. SEA 2001).
52. Etscheidt, supra note 46, at 225.
53. For the asserted legal support in the IDEA, see infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
For the ultimately contrasting case law interpretation, see infra notes 181–83 and accompanying
text.
54. John W. Maag & Antonis Katsiyannis, Behavioral Intervention Plans: Legal and Practical
Considerations for Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 31 BEHAV. DISORDERS 348
(2006).
55. OCR is the unit of the U.S. Department of Education responsible for administering Section
504 and the ADA as applied to students in K–12 schools. For a general overview of the OCR, see
the OCR’s website, which is available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html (last
visited July 18, 2011).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Allan G. Osborne & Charles J. Russo, Update on the Disciplinary Provisions of the 1997
and 2004 IDEA Amendments, 244 EDUC. LAW REP. 915 (2009).

184

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 35:175

seek to impose suspension of more than 10 days.”59 Osborne and Russo’s
conclusion was clearly correct for the 1999 IDEA regulations, but—as
summarized in Part III of this Article60—they missed the 2006 regulations’ elimination of this requirement upon the eleventh day of removal.
Similarly, they asserted broadly that “FBAs and BIPs are required regardless of whether students’ misconduct is a manifestation of their disabilities.”61 Thus, Osborne and Russo neglected the differential treatment
that, as explained below,62 Congress provided in the 2004 amendments.63
Finally, in a companion piece to the present study, I evaluated thirty-one state laws, including both statutes and regulations, that are specific to FBAs and BIPs in the special education context.64 Through a systematic tabulation of these state law provisions, which exceed the rather
narrow foundation requirements of the IDEA, I revealed that most of
these additions were of notably limited scope and specificity in terms of
extending the entitlement to FBAs and BIPs and establishing standards
for their appropriateness and implementation. California was the leading
exception, with New York a distant second, in terms of the scope and
specificity of additional provisions, such as definitional criteria for FBAs
and BIPs. Because I created the categories and criteria, which may differ
from those of scholars and researchers in special education, the reliability
and validity of the findings of this study are subject to critical review and
replication.
In sum, the literature to date lacks a sufficiently careful, comprehensive, and current analysis of the legal requirements specific to FBAs
and BIPs under the IDEA and related state laws. For case law addressing
the IDEA’s legal framework, the analyses to date also fail to differentiate
the following issues specific to FBAs and BIPs: (1) access (i.e., whether
the child is entitled to an FBA or a BIP); (2) appropriateness (i.e., whether the FBA or BIP meets applicable legal standards); and (3) implementation (i.e., whether the district sufficiently provided the FBA or BIP that
it had formulated).

59. Id. at 916.
60. See infra Part III.B.
61. Osborne & Russo, supra note 58, at 916.
62. See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
63. Notably, in a recent point-counterpoint feature, Osborne and Russo continued to maintain
the correctness of their interpretation of these two issues. See Allan Osborne, Charles Russo & Perry
A. Zirkel, You Be the Judge: Point/Counterpoint—FBAs and BIPs, 45 ELA NOTES 8 (July 2010).
64. Zirkel, supra note 50.
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III. IDEA FRAMEWORK
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of case law regarding FBAs and BIPs since the express recognition of the behavioral strategies in the 1997 IDEA amendments, with particular attention paid to the
trend and frequency of the issues and outcomes. Providing the framework for the case law analysis, Part III gives an overview of IDEA provisions and related administrative regulations and interpretations that specifically pertain to FBAs and BIPs.
The federal framework for the case law concerning FBAs and BIPs
consists of three ever-evolving levels of the IDEA: (1) the statute itself,
which is subject to periodic amendments and reauthorizations because it
is a funding law; (2) the regulations, which the administering agency issues after each set of amendments; and (3) the agency’s policy interpretations, which includes the commentary accompanying the regulations as
well as OSEP’s policy letters and memoranda. Also, as the OSEP interpretations expressly acknowledge, state laws may exceed this federal
minimum.65 The evolution of the IDEA legislation with respect to FBAs
and BIPs has had three stages. At first, the IDEA contained no express
provisions specific to FBAs and BIPs. Starting in 1997, the IDEA included specific provisions that were indirectly pertinent with regard to
IEPs 66 and directly pertinent with regard to disciplinary changes in
placement. 67 Finally, starting in 2004, these particular provisions were
refined to directly address FBAs and BIPs.
A. Legislation
The IDEA did not contain any local educational agency (LEA)68 requirements pertaining to FBAs or BIPs until the 1997 and 2004 amendments. First, without expressly mentioning either FBAs or BIPs, the
1997 amendments included the requirement, as a special consideration
for IEP teams, that “in the case of a child whose behavior impedes his or
her learning or that of others, consider, when appropriate, strategies, in-

65. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
66. An IEP is the document that the IDEA prescribes in considerable detail as the mechanism
to demonstrate that the district has provided FAPE in the LRE to the child with a disability. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68. The IDEA uses this term generically to refer to school districts and other local governmental entities that provide education to students with disabilities. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (2008). LEAs have the primary responsibility of implementing the
various requirements of the IDEA, subject to SEA oversight. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
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cluding positive behavioral interventions, strategies, and supports . . . .”69
The 2004 amendments slightly strengthened this special consideration
requirement by removing the “when appropriate” language and inserting
the more straightforward language requiring the IEP team to consider
“the use of positive behavioral intervention and supports, and other strategies” to address such behavior.70 The operant verb of these iterations
was “to consider,” not “to develop or implement,” and—more importantly—the objects were interventions, supports, and strategies, not specifically FBAs or BIPs.
Second, and more significantly, the 1997 amendments expressly required an FBA and a BIP in tandem with disciplinary changes in placement.71 Specifically, upon a disciplinary change in placement, including
a removal to an interim educational setting for three specified serious
behavior violations, the 1997 amendments required the development or
modification of an FBA and a BIP in tandem with a determination of
whether the student’s violation of the school’s conduct code is a manifestation of the student’s disability.72 The 2004 amendments subtly differentiated this requirement depending on the results of the manifestation
determination. For determinations that the conduct in question was a manifestation of the child’s disability, the requirement for an FBA and a
BIP remained the same.73 But for determinations that the conduct was
not a manifestation of the child’s disability and for removals to a fortyfive-day interim alternate educational setting,74 the language changed to
require “as appropriate, a[n] [FBA], behavior intervention services and
modifications that are designed to address the behavior violation so that
it does not recur.”75 Thus, the 2004 amendments relaxed the relevant re69. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
§ 614(d)(3)(B)(i), 111 Stat. 37 (1997). For a comprehensive comparative overview of the 1997
amendments, see Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions of Students with Disabilities: The
Latest Requirements, 214 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (2007).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
71. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
72. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997 § 615(k)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
The three specified situations for these forty-five-day interim placements were weapons violations,
use or possession of illegal drugs, and—as determined by the impartial hearing officer—substantial
likelihood of danger to self or others. Id.
73. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(1)(F)(i)–(ii).
74. The 2004 amendments added a fourth specified situation for the forty-five-day interim
placement—where the student inflicts serious bodily injury on another person. Id.
§ 1415(k)(1)(G)(iii).
75. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii). This differentiation is predicated on the qualifier “as appropriate,”
which weakens the requirement because it allows for exceptions in the scope of its application. But
to the extent that the tandem “so that it does not recur” standard is stronger in the applicable circumstances, the overall imposition “irrespective of whether the behavior is determined to be a manifestation of the child’s disability” removes the differentiation. Id.
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quirement in two ways: (1) they limited the FBA component to undefined appropriate circumstances, and (2) they used more generic options
than exclusively prescribing the BIP component.76 Overall, the legislation expressly required an FBA or a BIP only in connection with disciplinary changes in placement.
B. Regulations
As explained in a prior article,77 the 1999 regulations expanded on
the 1997 legislative amendments by requiring an “assessment plan” for
an FBA and a BIP for any child that did not already have them upon the
eleventh cumulative day of removal.78 The 2006 regulations, however,
dropped this requirement and otherwise largely mirrored the 2004
amendments in relevant parts. For example, the regulation for the IEP
special consideration of learning-impeding behavior follows the legislative provision word for word.79 Similarly, the relevant requirements for
FBAs and BIPs upon disciplinary changes in placement 80 are almost
identical to the legislative provisions. Like the legislation, the regulations
do not include a definition, much less criteria, for either an FBA or a
BIP. Thus, the regulations extended the requirement for FBAs or BIPs
only in relation to disciplinary removals, and that extension was limited
to FBAs only under the 1999 regulations not the presently applicable
2006 regulations.
C. OSEP Interpretations
In a policy memorandum issued directly after the 1997 amendments,81 OSEP clarified that the then new legislation did not require an
FBA for cumulative removals of less than ten days in a school year.82 In
the same interpretive guidance, OSEP recommended—by using the word
“should” rather than “shall”—proactive steps for learning-impeding be76. But the specified purpose of the more flexible behavioral component—designed to prevent
recurrence—arguably provided a more stringent standard of appropriateness.
77. Zirkel, supra note 69, at 447–48.
78. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,453 (Mar. 12, 1999). Unchanged from the 1999 version, the 2006 regulations trigger a disciplinary change in placement at
the eleventh consecutive school day of removal; for cumulative days, the regulations use a multifactor test for determining the point at which cumulative days amount, as a pattern, as the equivalent
of eleven consecutive days. 34 C.F.R. § 300.536 (2009).
79. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(1).
80. Id. §§ 300.530(d)(1)(ii), (f)(1).
81. In a policy letter before the 1997 amendments, OSEP made it clear that the IDEA does not
have a requirement for, or prohibition against, including BIPs in IEPs. Letter to Huefner, 23 IDELR
1072 (OSEP 1995).
82. OSEP Mem. No. 97–7, 26 IDELR 981 (OSEP 1997).
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havior. For example, OSEP stated that, in addition to the required consideration, “school districts should take prompt steps to address misconduct when it first appears,” providing that “when misconduct appears,
a[n] [FBA] could be conducted.”83 The following year, in response to an
inquiry that maintained that FBAs do not sufficiently honor a child’s
strengths, OSEP recited related provisions in the 1997 amendments that
emphasized positive behavior interventions and supports.84
In the commentary accompanying the 1999 regulations, OSEP included these interpretations:
A[n] [FBA] may be an evaluation requiring parent consent if it
meets the standard identified in [the regulation defining evaluations]. In other cases, it may be a review of existing data that can
be completed at the IEP meeting called to develop the assessment plan [upon the eleventh cumulative day]. If under [the special consideration regulation], IEP teams are proactively addressing a child’s behavior that impedes the child’s learning or that of
others in the development of IEPs, those strategies, including
positive behavioral interventions, strategies and supports in the
child’s IEP will constitute the [BIP] that the IEP team reviews
under [the requirements upon disciplinary changes in placement].85
The 1999 commentary also opined that “in appropriate circumstances,
the IEP team . . . might determine that the child’s [BIP] includes specific
regular or alternative disciplinary measures, such as denial of certain privileges or short suspensions, that would result from particular infractions
of school rules, along with positive behavior intervention strategies and
supports.”86
In the commentary accompanying the 2006 regulations, OSEP provided its interpretation of regulatory provisions concerning IEPs and manifestation determinations. For the behavior-impeding situation, OSEP
opined that FBAs and BIPs “are not required components of an IEP” unless state law provides otherwise. 87 More specifically, while viewing
FBAs as typically preceding positive behavioral strategies presumably as
a matter of best practice, OSEP rejected requiring an FBA for a child
whose behavior impedes the learning of the child or others because the

83. Id. at 982.
84. Letter to Anonymous, 30 IDELR 707 (OSEP 1998).
85. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,621 (Mar. 12, 1999).
86. Id. at 12,479.
87. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,629 (Aug. 14, 2006).
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statutory language “focuses on interventions and strategies, not assessments.”88
For manifestation determinations, OSEP declined to specify standards for a valid or current FBA, reasoning that “such decisions are best
left to the LEA, the parent, and [other] relevant members of the IEP
Team.”89 Moreover, declining to add a requirement for an FBA and a
BIP upon the determination that the misconduct was not a manifestation
of the student’s disability, 90 OSEP observed the change in legislative
language and cross-referenced the IEP special consideration as “a proactive approach . . . [that] should ensure that children who need [BIPs] to
succeed in school receive them.”91 Thus, like its interpretations relating
to the 1999 regulations, OSEP’s commentary encouraged preventive and
proactive practices but was careful not to expand the requirements of the
2006 regulations.
After the issuance of the 2006 regulations, OSEP added further relevant interpretations in the form of policy letters and memoranda. These
interpretations started with a policy letter tangentially related to the
FBAs and BIPs, in which OSEP wrote that state special education regulations that allow aversive interventions are not in conflict with the
IDEA.92 In this policy letter, OSEP differentiated recommendations and
requirements as follows: “While the [IDEA] requires that an IEP Team
consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and as
such, emphasizes and encourages the use of such supports, it does not
contain a flat prohibition on the use of aversive behavioral interventions.”93
Next, OSEP and its immediate parent agency, the Office of Special
Education and Rehabilitation Services (OSERS),94 issued four successive
clarifications that arguably reflect a revised emphasis on FBAs and BIPs.
First, OSERS took the position that the regulations require both an FBA
and a BIP only in cases of a disciplinary change in placement where the
conduct is determined to be a manifestation of the child’s disability, whereas the regulations permit an FBA or a BIP when the IEP Team deter-

88. Id. at 46,683.
89. Id. at 46,721.
90. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
91. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,721.
92. Letter to Trader, 48 IDELR ¶ 47 (OSEP 2006).
93. Id.
94. In the organizational structure of the U.S. Department of Education, OSEP is a unit within
OSERS. See About OSEP, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/abou
tus.html (last visited July 18, 2011).
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mines, under the special consideration provision or otherwise, that an
FBA or BIP is appropriate for the child.95
Second, and soon thereafter, OSEP said that an FBA is an evaluation or reevaluation that has special requirements, including parental
consent, but only if used to assist in determining a child’s eligibility for
“free appropriate public education” (FAPE). 96 As a result, OSEP concluded that (1) an FBA in such circumstances, including an FBA to revise the behavioral component in an IEP, requires parental consent; (2)
an FBA conducted for individual evaluative purposes to develop or modify a BIP may trigger a parent’s right to an independent educational evaluation at public expense; and (3) an FBA conducted as best practice to
assess the effectiveness of behavioral interventions in the school as a
whole would not require parental consent.97 The following year, OSEP
repeated the first consent interpretation of this earlier letter.98
Third, OSERS recently issued a superseding interpretation that
slightly strengthened its previous position by adding the following two
limited situations where the legislation or regulations expressly require a
BIP: (1) for a determination that the misconduct is not a manifestation of
the child’s disability; and (2) “[f]or a child with a disability whose behavior impedes his or her learning or that of others, and for whom the IEP
Team has decided that a BIP is appropriate.”99 In light of the statutory
qualifier “as appropriate,”100 the first situation is more of a reminder than
an expander. Similarly, the second situation is largely limited to a semantic circularity, as evidenced by comparing the previous memorandum101
with this more recent conclusion: “FBAs and BIPs must also be used
proactively, if the IEP Team determines that they would be appropriate
for the child.”102 But this more recent policy statement added definitional
guidance about an FBA:
An FBA focuses on identifying the function or purpose behind a
child’s behavior. Typically the process involves looking closely at a
wide range of child-specific factors (e.g., social, affective, environmental). Knowing why a child misbehaves is directly helpful to the
IEP Team in developing a BIP that will reduce or eliminate the
misbehavior.103
95. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 47 IDELR ¶ 227 (OSERS 2007).
96. Letter to Christiansen, 48 IDELR ¶ 161 (OSEP 2007).
97. Id.
98. Letter to Sarzynski, 51 IDELR ¶ 193 (OSEP 2008).
99. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 52 IDELR ¶ 231 (OSERS 2009).
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
101. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 47 IDELR ¶ 227 (OSERS 2007).
102. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 52 IDELR ¶ 231.
103. Id.
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Moreover, this latest OSERS discipline guidance, which is in a
question-and-answer format, slightly and perhaps insignificantly revised
the intervening OSEP interpretation regarding whether an FBA constitutes an evaluation or a reevaluation.104 By posing the question with regard to an individual child, OSERS’s interpretation requiring consent
would seem to be consistent with the 2007 OSEP letter.105 Similarly, the
additional clarification regarding independent educational evaluations
(IEE) would seem to square with the previous interpretation regarding
those at public expense: “[A] parent who disagrees with an FBA that is
conducted in order to develop an appropriate IEP also is entitled to request an IEE.”106
Fourth, between the two latest OSERS interpretations, OSEP provided guidance as to what the purposes and components of an FBA are
and who must conduct an FBA. More specifically, OSEP explained that
the IDEA does not specify the components of an FBA beyond its linkage
to the development of a BIP. Similarly, in the absence of IDEA specifications, OSEP deferred to state law as to who is qualified to conduct the
FBA, rejecting the contention that the IDEA requires FBAs to be conducted by a board-certified behavior analyst.107
Thus, the various OSERS and OSEP interpretations, which adjudicators often find persuasive but not binding,108 are not expansive with
regard to access, appropriateness, and implementation of FBAs and BIPs.
When carefully sifted from recommendations, the requirements specified
in these agency interpretations do not differ significantly from the express language of the IDEA legislation and regulations.
IV. METHOD
To trace the longitudinal trend and categorical distribution of the
frequency and outcomes of case law regarding FBAs and BIPs, this study
provides an analysis of the issue rulings within the cases specific to
FBAs and BIPs.109 For each ruling, the analysis of frequency (i.e., the
number of final adjudications) and outcomes (i.e., the distribution between rulings in favor of the parent and those in favor of the district) was
in terms of the successive issues for FBAs and BIPs, respectively. Issues
analyzed included the following: (1) whether the child was entitled to an
104. Id.
105. Letter to Christiansen, 48 IDELR ¶ 161 (OSEP 2007).
106. Id.
107. Letter to Janssen, 51 IDELR ¶ 253 (OSEP 2008).
108. See Zirkel, supra note 39.
109. For the distinction between cases and issue rulings as the unit of analysis, see, e.g., Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43, at 367.
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FBA or a BIP (designated as “access”);110 (2) whether the FBA or BIP
met the requisite standards for quality (designated as “appropriateness”);
and (3) whether the district actually and sufficiently provided the BIP111
(designated as “implementation”).112
The comprehensive sample113 consisted of both hearing/review officer decisions 114 and court decisions published in the Individual with
Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR) 115 specific to FBAs and
BIPs issued between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2010.116 The
primary search mechanism was the IDELR topical index,117 although the
following sources served to identify additional pertinent cases: (1) the
topical index and the Boolean search mechanism of Special Ed Connec-

110. This tentative term is operationally understandable but legally imprecise. More specifically, it combines the collective concept of legal rights, the limited per se requirements of the IDEA and
related state law, and the ad hoc concept of whether the individual child, under the particular circumstances of the case, was legally entitled to an FBA or a BIP.
111. Given the continuum of FBAs and BIPs, there were no cases regarding implementation of
an FBA. Beyond development—after access and appropriateness—of an FBA, the next stage is a
BIP. Thus, the FBA category had only two subcategories whereas the BIP had three.
112. These self-conceived labels appear herein simply as convenient short identifying phrases;
they are not accepted terms of art or science with regard to FBAs or BIPs. In accordance with the
field, however, they form a flowchart-like continuum that starts with access to an FBA and ends with
implementation of a BIP.
113. Although far more comprehensive than the previous legal studies specific to FBAs and
BIPs, “sample” here serves as a reminder that the target population is either all of the cases, including those not “published” in the broad sense of any national database, or all cases in the LRP database, which in recent years includes an increasing proportion of cases available only electronically.
114. The IDEA provides states with the option of having administrative adjudication via a onetier (i.e., hearing officer) or two-tier (i.e., hearing officer followed by review officer) system. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2009). The citations of hearing and review officer decisions customarily contain
the designation of “SEA” because the state education agency has the responsibility under the IDEA
to establish and supervise this system. Most states have a one-tier system. See, e.g., Zirkel & Scala,
supra note 12, at 5. For this reason, and because the IDELR does not generally distinguish between
hearing and review officer decisions, this study—like others—refers generically to “hearing/review
officer” decisions.
115. Published by LRP, IDELR is the only national hard-copy publication that includes not
only court decisions but also hearing and review officer decisions, and has done so regularly since
the late 1970s.
116. “Issued” in this context refers to the date of decision not the date of publication. Although
only an approximate dividing line, 1998 was the starting point because it was in the immediate wake
of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, which went into effect on October 1, 1997.
117. The principal topic headings were “Behavior Management/Modification” (specifically,
the subtopics “Aversives,” “Development of Plan,” “Functional Behavioral Assessments,” and “In
General”) and “Discipline” (specifically, the subtopics “Expulsion,” “Interim Alternate Educational
Placements,” “Relationship between Misconduct and Disability,” and “Suspensions”), but the subtopic headings of “Behavior Managements” and “Discipline” served as supplementary sources
where they appeared under other topic headings (e.g., under “Attention Deficit Disorders” and “Autism”).
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tion®;118(2) the cases cited in previous studies;119 and (3) the Westlaw
database.120
The primary selection criteria were that (1) the case had at least one
ruling on the merits specific to an FBA or a BIP, and (2) the decision was
the final adjudication for the precise FBA or BIP issue raised.121 As a
result of the first criterion,122 the survey excluded cases that (1) merely
mentioned an FBA or a BIP in the background;123 (2) identified an FBA
or a BIP issue but disposed of it on threshold technical grounds, such as
subject-matter jurisdiction;124 (3) included an FBA or a BIP only in the
remedy but not in the rulings or legal conclusions;125 (4) reported an FBA
or a BIP ruling at a lower, unpublished level that was not at issue in the
reported review decision;126 (5) ruled on a tangential FBA- or BIP-related
issue;127 (6) ruled on behavioral strategies not specific to an FBA or a
118. This electronic subscription service of LRP Publications also includes a topical index that
captures hearing/review officer and court decisions published in IDELR in addition to others available only electronically, which is similar to Westlaw’s coverage of court decisions more generally.
119. See Drasgow & Yell, supra note 35; Etscheidt, supra note 46; Maag & Katsiyannis, supra
note 54; Osborne & Russo, supra note 58.
120. For the Boolean searches, the search terms included “functional behavior assessment,”
“functional behavioral assessment,” “behavior intervention plan,” “behavior management plan,” and
“behavior support plan.”
121. Given the framework of this study, its scope did not extend to the occasional claim
beyond the IDEA or related state special education law. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Puerto Rico, 53 IDELR
¶ 325 (D.P.R. 2010) (ruling under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of “liberty”);
Alex G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Davis Unified Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR ¶ 130 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (ruling under
§ 504); Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR ¶ 256 (Pa. SEA 2004) (ruling under state gifted education regulations).
122. An occasional case met or missed the first criterion only marginally. Compare, e.g., CJN
v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 323 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003) (ruling that incomplete compliance with the
state’s BIP regulation was a minor procedural violation), with Evans v. Dist. No. 17 of Douglas
Cnty., 841 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1988) (skirting the issue of a lack of a BIP by resolving tuition reimbursement on lack of parental notice).
123. See, e.g., J.L. v. Francis Howell R-3 Sch. Dist., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 54 IDELR ¶ 5
(E.D. Mo. 2010); Vigo Cnty. Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 199 (Ind. SEA 2002).
124. See, e.g., C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2009); P.R. v. Cent.
Tex. Autism Ctr., Inc., 52 IDELR ¶ 222 (W.D. Tex. 2009); cf. M.S.-G. v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 236 (3d Cir. 2009) (insufficiency of due process hearing complaint);
Cabouli v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 202 F. App’x 519 (2d Cir. 2006) (pretransition from private
school); T.M. v. Allegany-Limestone Cent. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 148 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (mootness).
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Olathe Dist. Sch., 316 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Kan. 2003); Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 899 (Ark. SEA 1998); E. Cent. Kan. Special Educ. Coop., 31 IDELR ¶ 256
(Kan. SEA 1999); Alcorn Cnty. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 136 (Miss. SEA 2009).
126. See, e.g., T.B. v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 628 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2010); M.P. v. Noblesville Sch., 41 IDELR ¶ 33 (S.D. Ind. 2004); In re Student with a Disability, 42 IDELR ¶ 224 (Pa.
SEA 2005).
127. See, e.g., Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling on
whether an FBA is an evaluation); Belmont Pub. Sch., 49 IDELR ¶ 209 (Mass. SEA) (deciding
whether district may implement BIP without the IEP team considering its appropriateness); Bd. of
Educ. of New York City, 48 IDELR ¶ 294 (N.Y. SEA 2007) (ruling on parent’s request to maintain
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BIP;128 (7) ruled on an FBA or a BIP where a school district was not a
party;129 (8) ruled on a closely related issue but not on the FBA or BIP
itself;130 (9) ruled on an FBA or a BIP after the period of this study;131
and (10) ruled on an FBA or a BIP but in a forum different from an
IDEA hearing or review.132 The second criterion, which required searching the history of each case and selecting the final FBA or BIP ruling,133
resulted in the exclusion of two categories of cases: (1) the decisions in
IDELR that were superseded by subsequent, typically higher-level decisions in IDELR;134 and (2) the subsequent, typically higher-level decisions that did not address the previous FBA or BIP ruling.135
aversive BIP under the “stay-put” provision); Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR
¶ 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 74 (2009) (determining whether reduction in
reinforcement in BIP was violation of IDEA’s stay-put provision).
128. See, e.g., Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 49 IDELR ¶ 161 (E.D. Pa. 2008); San
Rafael Elementary Sch. Dist. v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1152
(N.D. Cal. 2007); Elizabethtown Area Sch. Dist., 50 IDELR ¶ 24 (Pa. SEA 2008); Montgomery
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 49 IDELR ¶ 174 (Md. SEA 2007); Surry Sch. Dep’t, 52 IDELR ¶ 209 (Me. SEA
2009); Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 248 (Tenn. SEA 2009).
129. See, e.g., A.G. v. Frieden, 52 IDELR ¶ 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling for Department of
Mental Health under Part C of the IDEA).
130. See, e.g., Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 319 F. Supp. 2d 446 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (ruling that in the absence of an FBA, the manifestation determination warranted strict scrutiny); Pell City Bd. of Educ., 38 IDELR ¶ 253 (Ala. SEA 2003); Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 37 IDELR
¶ 262 (Conn. SEA 2002) (ruling on whether a student who had a BIP needed an aide); cf. Masar v.
Bd. of Educ. of Fruitport Cmty. Sch., 39 IDELR ¶ 239 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (ruling that expert testimony concerning FBA was not at all decisive).
131. See, e.g., L.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR ¶ 280 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
132. See, e.g., St. Vrain Valley Dist. RE-1J, 38 IDELR ¶ 258 (Colo. SEA 2003) (ruling under
state’s complaint resolution process under the IDEA); Shakopee Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 720, 45
IDELR ¶ 171 (Minn. SEA 2005); In re Student with a Disability, 55 IDELR ¶ 299 (Wyo. SEA
2010); cf. J.D.P. v. Cherokee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (ruling on BIP
claim based on § 504). Similarly, the scope of the study did not extend to the complaint process of
the Office for Civil Rights, which is under § 504, not the IDEA. For an overview of these alternate
avenues and forums, see Zirkel & McGuire, supra note 12.
133. On occasion, the IDELR had duplicate entries for the same case. Compare Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 279, 30 IDELR 645 (Minn. SEA 1998); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 60 (Tex.
SEA 1998), with Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 33 IDELR ¶ 28 (Minn. SEA 1998); Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist., 31 IDELR ¶ 46 (Tex. SEA 1998).
134. Some of these cases were at the hearing/review officer level. See, e.g., Waukee Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 26 (Iowa SEA 2007); Forrestville Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 209 (Ill. SEA
2002); Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR ¶ 236 (N.H. SEA 2005); Lake Travis
Indep. Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR ¶ 204 (Tex. SEA 2005). Others were at the trial court level. See, e.g.,
Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 53 IDELR ¶ 77 (W.D. Mo. 2009); A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); S.J. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 218
(W.D. Wash. 2007); Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 299 (D.N.H.
2007); Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Renollett, 42 IDELR ¶ 83 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
135. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2010);
E.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 361 F. App’x 156 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2064 (2010); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267
(7th Cir. 2007); Bynum v. W. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Sys., 55 IDELR ¶ 68 (M.D. La. 2010); N.S.
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For each case that met the selection criteria, the coding was limited
to the relevant ruling or rulings (i.e., those specific to the FBA or BIP).
Thus, other rulings in the case were not part of the analysis.
The first step of the analysis was separating the FBA issues from
the BIP issues, and then further separating each category of cases into the
aforementioned subcategories of access, appropriateness, and implementation.136 The next step was coding the rulings for each of these identified
issues in terms of an established outcomes scale. 137 Initially, based on
previous studies that differentiated outcomes beyond complete wins or
losses,138 the coding of outcomes was according to the following scale
for issue rulings, 139 with the designation “parent” as proxy for the
child:140 1 = conclusively in favor of the parent;141 2 = inconclusively in
favor of the parent; 142 3 = even split between the parent and the district;143 4 = inconclusively in favor of the school district;144 and 5 = con-

v. Hawaii, 54 IDELR ¶ 250 (D. Haw. 2010); D.L. v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1178
(S.D. Iowa 2008).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111–12. Again, the exception was that FBA did not
have an implementation subcategory. Id.
137. The overlap between FBA and BIP categories or subcategories was notable in approximately one-fifth of the cases. As a result, the coding tended to merge not clearly differentiated rulings into the ultimate one, such as BIP for an undifferentiated FBA–BIP overlap, or appropriateness
for an undifferentiated access–appropriateness overlap. Thus, the coding was relatively conservative
and, in some cases, only tentative.
138. The differentiation depended on the unit of analysis as well as the purpose of the study.
See, e.g., Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43, at 368 (using a five-category outcome scale for issue
rulings); William H. Lupini & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcomes Analysis of Education Litigation, 17
EDUC. POL’Y, 257, 263–64 (2003) (using a seven-category scale for cases); James R. Newcomer &
Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILD. 469, 472 (1999) (using a five-category outcome scale for judicial review); Perry A. Zirkel &
Caitlyn Lyons, Restraining the Use of Restraints with Student with Disabilities?: An Empirical
Analysis of the Case Law, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 323 (2011) (using a five-category scale for claim
rulings).
139. Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43, found that for specific issue rulings, rather than overall cases, the outcome categories of predominantly, as contrasted with completely, for one party or
the other were not necessary.
140. The cases did not include any of the limited situations where parents were exercising their
independent rights under the IDEA. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Problematic Progeny of Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 248 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009).
141. Examples are rulings on the merits in the parent’s favor not only after a hearing, trial, or
appeal but also—and more typically in judicial review under the IDEA than in hearing/review officer decisions—via granting a parent’s motion for summary judgment.
142. Exclusively limited to the judicial stage in this study, examples are rulings denying a
district’s dispositive motion or, on appeal, upholding such a denial.
143. This category is limited to the relatively rare rulings denying both parties’ motions for
summary judgment or awarding the parent approximately half of the relief sought.
144. Paralleling its obverse outcomes category of a “2,” examples herein were limited to court
rulings denying a parent’s motion for summary judgment or, on appeal, upholding such a denial.
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clusively in favor of the school district.145 Although the data analysis for
frequency and outcomes followed the model of previous research where
the appropriate unit of analysis was one or more rulings within a case,146
the near absence of rulings in the aforementioned intermediate categories
(i.e., 2, 3, and 4) allowed for outcomes analysis within the simpler dichotomous scale of rulings in favor of the parent or the district (i.e., 1 or 5,
respectively).147
V. RESULTS
The total number of relevant cases for the thirteen-year period of
the study 148 was 173, with 125 by hearing/review officers and 48 by
courts.149 In turn, the 173 cases yielded 206 issue rulings, with 150 by
hearing/review officers and 56 by courts.150 Of the 206 issue rulings, 57,
or 24%, were for FBAs, and the remaining 149, or 72%, were for BIPs.
Figure 1 displays the frequency of cases and issue rulings per threeyear intervals for the thirteen-year period, with the most recent interval
being a straight-line projection made by tripling the initial year. The note
at the bottom clarifies that the percentage in each white bar represents the
proportion of these rulings issued by courts rather than by hearing/review
officers.

145. Similarly corresponding to outcomes category “1,” examples are rulings on the merits in
the district’s favor either after a hearing, trial, or appeal, or via granting of a district’s motion for
dismissal or summary judgment.
146. Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43; cf. Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 138 (using the claim
ruling as the primary unit of analysis but also providing a culminating outcomes analysis of cases
because the tabulation included all of the rulings in the case).
147. The exclusion of closely related but separable rulings eliminated two potential exceptions
in terms of inconclusive rulings. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. For the only remaining
exception, Decatur Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 45 IDELR ¶ 294 (Ind. SEA 2006), the original coding of
“3” for BIP implementation was resolved by separation into two rulings—a “1” for the first year and
a “2” for the second year.
148. See supra text accompanying note 116.
149. A spreadsheet listing all of the cases and rulings is available from the author upon request.
150. The resulting ratio of relevant rulings per case was 1.19 for the total sample, 1.20 for the
hearing/review officer cases, and 1.17 for the court cases.
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“Ct.” = Court rulings (as a percentage, with the remainder being hearing/review officer rulings).

An examination of Figure 1 reveals that the overall levels across the
entire period amounted to an uneven, modestly upward trajectory.
Moreover, the ratio between cases and issue rulings for each of the successive intervals oscillated within a limited range.151 Finally, the proportion of rulings from courts, compared with those from hearing/review
officers, increased dramatically from the initial to the most recent intervals, with the understanding that the last interval was limited to only one
year.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the combined hearing/review
officer and court issue rulings for each of the successive three-year periods in terms of the two ultimate outcome categories: whether the ruling
was in favor of the parent or the district. The notes at the bottom designate the aforementioned 152 adjustment and the limited interval for the
final year.

151. Specifically, the respective ratios for the successive intervals were as follows: 1.08 for the
years 1998–2000; 1.23 for the years 2001–2003; 1.26 for the years 2004–2006; 1.21 for the years
2007–2009; and 1.06 for the years 2010–2011.
152. See supra note 147.
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Figure 2. Longitudinal Outcomes of Issue Rulings
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Distribution of Outcomes

80%
70%
60%
50%

For Parent

40%

For District

30%
20%
10%
0%
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2007-2009*

2010**

* One ruling, which was an even split for two successive annual IEPs together, was separated
into two rulings—one in favor of the parent for the first year and the other in favor of the district for
the second year.
** Only a one-year period.

Overall, Figure 2 shows that outcomes have gradually shifted from
a majority clearly favoring the plaintiff–parents to a majority clearly favoring the defendant–school districts, with the dividing point approximately marked by the 2004 amendments to the IDEA. The proportion of
outcomes in the district’s favor was dramatically pronounced for the
most recent interval, but this interval was limited to only one year.
Figure 3 presents the frequency distribution of the issue rulings in
terms of the FBA and BIP categories and, within them, the further subcategories of access, appropriateness, and implementation.153

153. As previously explained, there were no FBA implementation rulings. See supra note 111.
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Figure 3 illustrates that the BIP category accounted for far more
rulings than the FBA category 154 and that the primary focuses were
access for FBAs and appropriateness for BIPs.
Figure 4 displays the outcomes in favor of each side for each issue
subcategory—access, appropriateness, and, for BIPs, implementation.

154. More specifically, the BIP category accounted for 149, or 73%, of the 206 rulings.
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Overall, Figure 4 shows that the ratio of issue rulings hovered at or
near an even split between the two sides (with slight balances in favor of
parents in two subcategories), except for implementation of a BIP, which
heavily favored school districts. But the differentiation was tentative in
light of the small number of BIP implementation rulings155 and the notable overlap among the subcategories.156
Next, Table 1 presents the outcome results for FBAs and BIPs in
terms of the respective hearing/review officer and judicial forums. The
final column reports the chi-square (2) analysis, which shows whether
the difference in the outcomes distribution between the two forums was
statistically significant (i.e., generalizable at a high level of probability).157
Table 1. Distribution of Outcomes Per Forum and Category
Hearing/Review Officer

Court

2

For Parent

For District

For Parent

For District

FBA

25 (63%)

15 (38%)

4 (24%)

13 (76%)

2=5.77a*

BIP
Total

60 (55%)
85 (57%)

50 (45%)
65 (43%)

10 (26%)
14 (25%)

29 (74%)
42 (75%)

2=9.66**
2=16.38**

a

With Yates’s correction, which is a conservative adjustment to chi-square when applied to

2-by-2 distributions with one or more cells with frequencies less than five.

* p (i.e., probability) < .05
** p < .01

This table shows that the hearing/review officers’ FBA and BIP issue rulings favored parents, while the courts’ FBA and BIP rulings favored districts. The differences between the two forums were statistically
significant at the .05 and .01 probability levels, respectively. This inferential analysis suggests a high likelihood that the results for this sample

155. As Figure 3 reveals, BIP implementation accounted for nineteen issue rulings, which
amounted to 13% of the BIP subtotal and 9% of the total issue rulings.
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
157. Chi-square is a statistical procedure to determine whether the frequency counts in two or
more categories in a sample (here, published FBA and BIP rulings) are differently distributed to a
significant extent, i.e., that the frequency counts are not due to chance but are instead generally
applicable with a high degree of probability to a population (here, all FBA and BIP rulings, including those that are not available in the Westlaw and LRP databases). See, e.g., MEREDITH D. GALL ET
AL., EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 325–27 (2007). The customary degrees of probability (designated as
“p”) are .05 and .01, equating to 95% and 99%, respectively. L.R. GAY ET AL., EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH 329 (2009).
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are generalizable to the target population of hearing/review officer and
court decisions.158
Table 2 shows the respective outcomes of the issue rulings concerning FBAs and BIPs, along with chi-square analysis,159 for the combination of the two forums.
Table 2. Distribution of Outcomes Per Category

FBA
BIP
Total

For Parent
29 (51%)
70 (47%)
99 (48%)

For District
28 (49%)
79 (53%)
107 (52%)

2
2=0.25 ns

ns = not statistically significant

This table shows that the difference between the outcomes of the
FBA and BIP issues rulings was not statistically significant.160 Thus, the
difference was most likely due to chance alone (i.e., as a result of sampling or measurement error). Additionally, Table 2 illustrates that when
all of the issue rulings are analyzed together, the districts fared slightly
better (52%) than the parents (48%).
Finally, the coding of the cases included notes on the role and basis
of the FBA and BIP issue rulings in relation to the IDEA framework.161
These notes were largely qualitative observations based on the hearing/review officer’s or judge’s disposition of the FBA and BIP issues. A
synthesis of these observations follows, first on an overall basis and then
in terms of each of the issue subcategories.
First, in most cases, the FBA–BIP analysis was only a small part of
the overall case, either as one of several issues or as a component of a
larger primary issue. Different from the IDEA framework, wherein an
FBA and a BIP are express requirements only for disciplinary changes in
placement,162 the majority of the cases concerned the statutory staples of
FAPE or, less frequently, LRE.163
158. See supra note 113. The intervening factor is the extent to which the sample is sufficiently
representative of the target population. This issue has been subject to only limited and inconclusive
research. See, e.g., Anastasia D’Angelo, J. Gary Lutz & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Published IDEA Hearing Officer Decisions Representative?, 14 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 241 (2004).
159. See supra note 157.
160. “Not statistically significant” means that the chi value did not approach the requisite minimum level of p < .05. See also supra note 157.
161. See discussion supra Part III; supra notes 65–108 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. For a discussion of these interrelated cornerstones of the IDEA, see, e.g., the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley, the Court elabo-
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For what is here broadly referred to as “access,” hearing/review officers and courts tended to use some variation of the behavior-impeding
standard. 164 But in the hearing/review officer cases, especially in the
many states that lack a legal standard distinctly different than that of the
IDEA,165 the basis for the ruling tended to be rather ad hoc and often
cryptic, explicitly or implicitly based on the evidence in the case, whereas the courts tended to cite and apply the standard under the IDEA, or
if there was one, the standard under state law. Moreover, the courts
tended to be much stricter than hearing/review officers, interpreting
“consider”166 and, when raised, “positive”167 as not being per se requirements of access to an FBA or a BIP.168 Finally, led by the Second Circuit’s recent decision in A.C. v. Board of Education of Chappaqua Central School District,169 the federal district courts in New York have used
the IDEA harmless procedural error approach to essentially nullify the
effect of the state’s more rigorous standard for FBA access.170

rated a two-part test for FAPE: (1) compliance with the procedures set forth in the IDEA, and, on the
substantive side, (2) an individualized program reasonably calculated to enable the child with disabilities to receive educational benefits. Id. at 207–08. Although widely used in subsequent court
decisions, the Court crafted this test specifically for the child in this case in relation to the LRE, or
“mainstreaming,” mandate for education with nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. Id. at 203–04. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed LRE in terms of a
corresponding test, several appellate courts have developed multipart frameworks that typically
include a behavioral factor. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The “Inclusion” Case Law: A Factor Analysis,
127 EDUC. L. REP. 533 (1998). When the FBA or BIP issues arise in LRE cases, if at all, it is in
connection with this behavioral factor.
164. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. In the FAPE context, the focus was on
whether the behavior impeded the child’s own learning whereas in the LRE context, the focus tended
to extend to the effect on other children’s learning.
165. Zirkel, supra note 50 and accompanying text. In addition to California and New York,
which have stronger and more extensive provisions for FBAs and BIPs, Minnesota and Pennsylvania
were particularly notable in terms of their stronger standard for access to FBAs and BIPs, respectively. However, inasmuch as the cases extend back to 1998, there have been at least limited changes in
state laws and the IDEA during the period of this study. See, e.g., Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12,
34 IDELR ¶ 305 (Pa. SEA 2001); Kennett Consol. Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR ¶ 54 (Pa. SEA 1999); Jim
Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 320 (Pa. SEA 1998); Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 493 (Pa.
SEA 1998).
166. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
167. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (2008).
168. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 1827 (1st Cir.
2008); J.A. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); J.K. v. Metro. Sch.
Dist. Sw. Allen Cnty., 44 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005); Robert B. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist.,
44 IDELR ¶ 123 (E.D. Pa. 2005); cf. Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. M.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D.
Tex. 2007) (addressing the issue jurisdictionally and only in terms of considering behavioral interventions).
169. A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2009).
170. M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 54 IDELR ¶ 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); M.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Educ., 54 IDELR ¶ 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Connor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 192
(E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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For the “appropriateness” issues, following the overriding twodimensional view of FAPE,171 both the hearing officers and the courts
tended to view the FBA or BIP issues as procedural, but they ultimately
relied on the substantive standard of reasonable benefit.172 Absent definitions for FBAs and BIPs in the IDEA,173 and absent specific standards
for FBAs and BIPs in most state laws,174 the basis for the hearing/review
officer’s or court’s rulings, to the extent specified in the decisions, were
most often evidentiary. Expert witnesses, including qualified school personnel, played a notable role in terms of providing and applying criteria.
In some cases, the adjudicator cited Rowley; 175 in other cases, Rowley
was implicit within the general harmless error procedural approach; 176
and in still other cases, the standard was not at all clear, with the decision
only offering a cryptic conclusion incidental to other larger issues.177
Most interesting of all, the following sequence of cases provides a
chronological, flipbook-style illustration for the foregoing forum comparison: 178 (1) the development by an Iowa hearing officer of a fourcriteria test for BIP appropriateness that was composed of professional
standards incorporated in a variety of previous hearing/review officer
decisions;179 (2) the application of this test in subsequent hearing officer
decisions in two jurisdictions;180 (3) the rejection of this test by the Se171. See supra note 163. Hearing/review officers and courts in these cases tended to use the
Rowley two-part characterization regardless of whether expressly treating the FBA or BIP issues as
FAPE.
172. Prior to and during the period of this study, the courts developed and consistently used a
harmless error approach when analyzing procedural violations of the IDEA. Under the harmless
error approach, a procedural violation is not a per se denial of FAPE. Congress eventually codified
this approach in the 2004 amendments to the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E). This approach treats
a procedural violation as a denial of FAPE only if it results in the program not being reasonably
calculated to yield benefit. Id.
173. See supra Part III.B.
174. Zirkel, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 88 (Tex. SEA 1999).
176. See, e.g., Edwin K. v. Jackson, 33 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
177. See, e.g., A.H. v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 55 IDELR ¶ 36 (2d Cir. 2010); Dumont
Bd. of Educ. v. J.T., 54 IDELR ¶ 231 (D.N.J. 2010); New Haven Unified Sch., 44 IDELR ¶ 207
(Cal. SEA 2005); Acad. Sch. Dist. #20, 37 IDELR ¶ 171 (Colo. SEA 2002); E. Cent. Kan. Special
Educ. Coop., 31 IDELR ¶ 256 (Kan. SEA 1999). Greater Albany Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 56 (Or.
SEA 2007); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 25 (Pa. SEA 2008); Connally Indep. Sch. Dist.,
34 IDELR ¶ 309 (Tex. SEA 2001).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 157–58.
179. Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 50 (Iowa SEA 2001). The hearing officer was
a nonattorney special education professor who authored a BIP study five years later. See Etscheidt,
supra note 46.
180. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 209 (Ill. SEA 2002); Lynn-Mar
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR ¶ 24 (Iowa SEA 2004) (rulings by different hearing officers); Mason
City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 50 (Iowa SEA 2001) (ruling in a different case with the same
hearing officer).
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venth Circuit in Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Community School District;181 (4) the limited moderation of the Alex R. rejection in a recent unpublished Iowa federal court decision, which affirmed the same Iowa
hearing officer’s most recent pertinent decision;182 (5) the reaffirmation
of Alex R. in other jurisdictions’ judicial rulings in a more districtdeferential manner;183 and (6) the elimination of Iowa’s part-time, largely
special-education-trained hearing officers and replacement with full-time
governmental administrative law judges (ALJs).184

181. The opinion stated:
[N]either Congress nor the agency charged with devising the implementing regulations
for the IDEA, the Department of Education, had created any specific substantive requirements for the [BIP] contemplated by § 1415(k)(1) or § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). Alex does
not point us to any statute or regulation that has since filled the gap, and our research has
uncovered none. Alex, nevertheless, urges us to follow the lead of the administrative
judge in Mason City, who manufactured the substantive criteria of a sufficient behavioral
intervention plan based on a string of administrative opinions. We decline the invitation.
Although we may interpret a statute and its implementing regulations, we may not create
out of whole cloth substantive provisions for the behavioral intervention plan contemplated by [the IDEA]. In short, the District’s [BIP] could not have fallen short of substantive criteria that do not exist, and so we conclude as a matter of law that it was not substantively invalid under the IDEA.
Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004).
182. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Isabel L., 51 IDELR ¶ 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (interpreting Alex
R. and related decisions as rejecting substantive standards but allowing consideration of these factors
within the overall and overriding determination of FAPE). For another, more confusing limitation of
Alex R., see Lewis Central School District, 42 IDELR ¶ 247 (Iowa 2005).
183. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008);
T.W. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 136 F. App’x 122 (10th Cir. 2005); Lake Travis Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. M.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D. Tex. 2005); J.K. v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Sw. Allen Cnty., 44
IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005). Although the language excerpted from the court’s decision in Waukee Community School District, see supra note 182, could be interpreted as supporting the behaviorimpeding standard for a BIP, the First Circuit was more representative of the prevailing judicial
interpretation:
An even more egregious misunderstanding of the IDEA’s requirements undermines the
claim of procedural error based on a missing behavioral plan. The IDEA only requires a
behavioral plan when certain disciplinary actions are taken against a disabled child. The
appellants make no claim that the necessary disciplinary predicate had transpired in this
instance. The other statutory provision cited by the appellants—20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)—also falls short of requiring a behavioral plan as an ubiquitous feature in every IEP. That statute, in terms, directs IEP teams to “consider, when appropriate,” formulating such plans.
Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d at 26–27 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(k)(1)(A) & (B); Alex. R., 375 F.3d at 614); see also J.K. v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Sw. Allen Cnty.,
44 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
184. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Iowa Department of Education and the Iowa
Department of Inspections and Appeals (June 7, 2010) (on file with author). In Iowa, the ALJs work
in the Administrative Hearings Division of the Department of Inspections and Appeals. See Administrative Hearings Division, IOWA DEP’T OF INSPECTIONS & APPEALS, http://dia.iowa.gov/page10.
html (last visited July 6, 2010).
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For the relatively few “implementation” issue rulings, the bases of
the rulings were consistently evidentiary, and the approach tended to use
substantial or ad hoc equitable, rather than 100%, compliance as the
standard.185 Although not typically cited in these rulings, court decisions
in general FAPE cases have similarly adopted a less than strict standard
for IEP implementation.186
VI. DISCUSSION
The major findings in this study were that (1) the frequency of FBA
and BIP cases increased modestly since the 1997 IDEA amendments; (2)
the outcomes during this period shifted after approximately 2004 from a
parent-favorable to a district-favorable overall balance; (3) the most frequent category and subcategory of the issue rulings were BIPs and their
appropriateness, respectively; (4) the outcomes within each of the categories and subcategories were relatively balanced between parents and
districts, with the exception of BIP implementation, which was relatively
infrequent but heavily skewed in favor of districts; and (5) the outcomes
were not significantly different between the FBA and BIP categories, but
they were significantly more favorable for districts in the judicial forum
than in the hearing/review officer forum for both FBAs and BIPs.
A. Forum Difference
The most statistically and pervasively significant of these findings
compared the outcomes per forum187 and merits discussion prior to the
other findings. FBAs and BIPs are so interrelated, both in terms of professional practice and legal treatment, that the adjudicatory outcomes
would be expected to be similar. But the significantly higher number of
district-favorable rulings at the judicial level compared to the hearing/review officer level is expected and helps explain and interpret the
other findings of this study.
This statistically significant forum-based difference is expected because of three key institutional differences. First, although in recent years
there has been a gradual move toward using judges in hearing/review

185. See, e.g., L. v. North Haven Bd. of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶ 254 (D. Conn. 2009); Bd. of Educ.
v. Michael R., 44 IDELR ¶ 36 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007);
Wilkes-Barre Area Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR ¶ 17 (Pa. SEA 1999).
186. See, e.g., Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011); Van
Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007); Melissa S. v. Sch. Dist., 183 F. App’x
184 (3d Cir. 2006); Catalan v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2007); Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
187. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
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officer proceedings under the IDEA,188 the hearing officers in the majority (n=33) of the states are part-time personnel with full-time roles—for
example, private attorneys—rather than professional ALJs.189 Despite the
formal, special education background of both groups being relatively
limited, 190 the predominant group obviously has a less strict judicial
posture. Second, the informal nature of these administrative adjudications contributes to a less strict adjudicative perspective. Finally, because
the hearing officer stage is the principal and often sole source of fact
finding,191 expert testimony plays a much more direct role. Thus, it was
not surprising that a statistically significant difference between the two
forums was found. Equally unsurprising was the qualitative difference
revealing that hearing/review officers, compared to courts, tended to be
less strict in legal interpretation and relied more on expert testimony that
reflected professional norms.192
Perhaps the best illustration of this significant forum-based finding
is the difference between, and the progression from, the Iowa hearing
officer’s best practice decision and the Seventh Circuit’s Alex R. ruling.193 Similarly, given the hierarchal structure of the stare decisis doctrine and the comparative impact of the judicial decisions, the Second
Circuit’s A.C. decision further illustrates the cumulative tendency to shift
the outcomes in the defendant–school districts’ favor194 unless the IDEA
or state laws are amended to combat that tendency.
B. Longitudinal Frequency
This significant forum-based difference contributes to the explanation of the first finding of the study, which was the relatively modest increase in the number of FBA and BIP cases since the 1997 amendments
of the IDEA.195 This increase was in the same direction, but to a lesser
degree, as the longitudinal trend in special education case law general-

188. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel et al., Creeping Judicialization of Special Education Hearings:
An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007).
189. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 12, at 5. The number of two-tier states (i.e., those with a review officer level) has dwindled to ten, with all but New York being at the part-time level. Id.
190. Id. at 6.
191. The IDEA authorizes courts to hear additional evidence, but the clear majority of courts
decide their review of hearing/review officer decisions on summary judgment. See, e.g., Andriy
Krahmal, Perry A. Zirkel & Emily Kirk, “Additional Evidence” Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 201 (2004).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 165–68 and 173–74.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 179–84.
194. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Figure 1.
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ly.196 A differentially higher trajectory might have been expected in light
of this first-time recognition in the IDEA of FBAs and BIPs, as well as
the increasing emphasis of this linked pair of behavioral strategies in the
special education literature leading to and following this recognition.197
Not surprisingly, most of the FBA and BIP issue rulings arose as a relatively small part of a larger FAPE or LRE case rather than in disciplinary
change-of-placement cases 198 where IDEA recognition is clearest but
litigation is infrequent.199 But the less obvious and perhaps more powerful contributing factor was the effect of judicial precedents that were systematically more favorable to districts than the underlying hearing/review officer decisions.
The cumulative and immediately predictable effect is stronger in
light of the finding of a marked increase in the proportion of case law at
the judicial, rather than hearing/review officer, level during the thirteenyear period of this study.200 This dramatic increase may be attributable to
the time lag in moving from decisions at the administrative level to the
final decision upon judicial review.201 Another possible explanation contributing to this shift, which is purely speculative in the absence of available empirical evidence, is a change in the percentage of FBA and BIP
cases subject to judicial review or selected for IDELR publication.
Whatever the reason, the effect is contrary to the proactive direction of
special education norms but with two possible exceptions. First, as the
196. Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra note 44, at 740 (finding uneven growth of IDELR-published
hearing/review officer decisions in three-year periods from 1977–1979 to 1998–2000); Perry A.
Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (finding pronounced increase in special education court decisions in Westlaw database within ten-year periods, especially in the most recent decade). The overlap with, rather
than identity of, time periods and adjudicatory forum precludes definitive comparisons.
197. But the limited scope of this recognition, as largely confirmed in the subsequent regulations, the 2004 amendments, and the relatively few state laws providing much stronger recognition,
may have had a dampening effect. See Zirkel, supra note 50 and accompanying text. Another possible moderating factor is the relatively limited role of FBAs and BIPs in special education disputes
compared to such high-stakes issues as tuition reimbursement. See, e.g., Thomas Mayes & Perry A.
Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL &
SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001) (finding marked increase in such litigation in initial period after statutory
codification in IDEA 1997).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 162–63.
199. For example, in the ten successive updates of published court decisions under the IDEA,
FAPE has by far been the largest segment of the litigation while discipline has been one of the smallest segments. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Tessie Rose, Special Education Law Update X, 240
EDUC. L. REP. 503 (2009).
200. See supra Figure 1. Specifically, the percentages in the white bars represent the proportion
of FBA and BIP rulings attributable to the courts instead of hearing/review officers.
201. For example, in a recent study of autism litigation, the average time between the hearing
officer decision and the final decision after judicial review was approximately 2.8 years. Perry A.
Zirkel, Autism Litigation under the IDEA: A New Meaning of “Disproportionality”?, J. SPECIAL
EDUC. LEADERSHIP (forthcoming 2011).
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1997 IDEA originally illustrated, legislation and regulations may be
amended to incorporate professional norms. Second, school districts may
opt to engage in proactive best practice as professionally appropriate or
as litigation avoidance.202
C. Longitudinal Outcomes
This forum-based difference, in combination with the increasing
proportion of court rulings, appears to be the principal reason for the
shift during this period from a parent-favorable to a district-favorable
overall balance. In contrast, although the approximate balancing point in
the outcome ratio was 2004,203 the IDEA amendments of that year would
not appear to be a major independent contributing factor because (1)
their effective date was not until mid-2005, and the courts have predominantly rejected their retroactive application;204 and (2) the IDEA’s dispute resolution process is rather “ponderous.”205 It may be, however, that
the narrowness of these amendments had a confirming effect on adjudicators.206 In any event, caution is warranted because the unit of analysis
for outcomes was the issue, not the case.207
D. Categorical Frequency and Outcomes
The predominance of BIP rulings,208 particularly those concerning
appropriateness, is not surprising in light of (1) the more concrete and
culminating nature of BIPs in the FBA–BIP process; (2) the lack of BIP
criteria in the IDEA;209 and (3) the overriding FAPE analysis in many
202. The alternative hypothesis—that the case law is only representative of infrequent exceptions to best practice—is much less likely because (1) there would be little reason for the continuous
flow of special education legislation and regulations and the increase in litigation if prevailing practice was at this optimum level; and (2) the outcomes would be much less district favorable overall
and longitudinally.
203. See supra Figure 2.
204. See, e.g., Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2010); Bell v. Bd. of
Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 52 IDELR ¶ 161 (D.N.M. 2008); Anthony v. District of Columbia,
463 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2006).
205. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). Although the
time lag is particularly pronounced for judicial review, e.g., supra note 201, the hearing/review
officer stage often exceeds the regulatory timeline. See, e.g., Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Office of the State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 634 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2011); Dep’t of Educ.,
State of Haw. v. T.G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw. 2010); O.O. v. District of Columbia, 573 F. Supp.
2d 41 (D.D.C. 2008); E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 39 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Doe v. E. Greenwich Sch. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 2006).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 70, 73–75.
207. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Figure 3.
209. In most jurisdictions, state law has not played a major role in this respect. See Zirkel,
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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cases.210 But the fluid boundaries between and within the FBA and BIP
issue categorization cautions against overreliance on these counts.211
The outcomes analysis in Figure 4 revealed that parents fared as
well as or slightly better than districts for each subcategory, except for
the relatively infrequent subcategory of BIP implementation. These outcomes are based on issue rulings that averaged approximately 1.2 per
case212 and which were sometimes only an incidental part of much larger
issues.213 Indeed, in an occasional case, the outcome of a marginal FBA
or BIP issue was different from the outcome of the central issue.214 Although not identical with respect to the unit of analysis, time period, or
outcomes scale, the balance was at least modestly more parent-favorable
for the FBA and BIP rulings—with the limited exception of BIP implementation—than the previous research.215 The difference may be due to
the lack of specific standards and ad hoc reliance on professional opinion
via expert witnesses, especially in the hearing/review officer decisions.216
In contrast, the relatively few implementation cases were largely matter
of facts instead of opinion when the standard was rather concrete217 and
when the school officials had the obvious “home field” advantage in
terms of the evidence and the burden of proof.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although both the IDEA (in its next reauthorization) and state laws
are a macro or policymaking solution, both in terms of providing more
stringent standards for access to and appropriateness of FBAs and BIPs,
this model is unlikely to be used to its fullest extent in light of the current
political climate. The height of the professional push for, as well as policymaking receptivity to, such proactive approaches to improving behavior was in the 1997 IDEA amendments. Since then, the focus has been
on academic improvement as illustrated by the No Child Left Behind

210. See supra text accompanying notes 163, 171.
211. Approximately one-fifth of the cases presented issue identification at the margin between
categories or subcategories thus leading to tentative counts. See supra note 137.
212. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 163–64.
214. See, e.g., E. Cent. Kan. Special Educ. Coop., 31 IDELR ¶ 256 (Kan. SEA 1999) (ruling
not only in favor of the parent for the BIP issue but also in favor of the district for the larger primary
issue of LRE).
215. See, e.g., Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra 44, at 744–47 (previous studies and hearing/review
officer and court decisions from 1989 to 2000). All of these other studies used the case rather than
the issue category or subcategory as the unit of analysis. Moreover, the majority were limited to
court decisions.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 173–74.
217. See supra text accompanying note 186.
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Act218 and on cutbacks in governmental resources for public education,
including the emphasis on proactive reforms and interventions.219
A more feasible and potentially favorable solution,220 especially in
light of the individualized nature of the IDEA and evolving science and
art of special education, is a more coherent case-by-case application of
the available standards. Specifically, what is roughly referred to here as
“access,” representing when a child is entitled to an FBA or a BIP under
the IDEA, could be reasonably decided—in terms of being more predictable and parsimonious221—via the well-established IDEA concept of, and
standard for, “related services.”222 First, this IDEA concept has a broad
definition that is sufficiently ample and flexible to cover FBAs and BIPs.
More specifically, the IDEA regulations define “related services” in relevant part as “developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as
are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.”223 The long and nonexhaustive list of examples includes “psychological services,” which in turn are defined by the IDEA regulations
to include administering assessment procedures and interpreting assessment results; “[o]btaining, integrating, and interpreting information about
child behavior”; and “[a]ssisting in developing positive behavioral inter-

218. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the effects of this Act, see, e.g.,
Sandy Kress et al., When Performance Matters: The Past, Present, and Future of Consequential
Accountability in Public Education, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 185 (2011); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004). For highlights of
the Act’s interactions with the IDEA, see Perry A. Zirkel, What Does It Mean for Students with
Disabilities, 185 EDUC. L. REP. 804 (2004).
219. For samples of the widespread recognition of the effects of the economy on public education, see John Dayton et al., Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?: Contemplating the Future of School
Funding Litigation in Tough Economic Times, 258 EDUC. L. REP. 937 (2010); Monica Teixeira de
Sousa, A Race to the Bottom?: President Obama’s Incomplete and Conservative Strategy for Reforming Education in Struggling Schools or the Perils of Ignoring Poverty, 39 STETSON L. REV. 629
(2010).
220. More careful experimentation in the form of enacting specific and stringent state specialeducation laws, with accompanying careful research and scholarship, is warranted before adding to
the many mandates of the IDEA. See, e.g., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 239, 269 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“Hard decisions of resource allocation, like the determinations of educational policy are best left to
the states, in the first instance.”).
221. Cost is a recognized, though not primary or uniform, factor in adjudicating special education cases. See, e.g., Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost Be a
Factor in Special Education Cases?, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1992). This federal requirement serves as
a minimum foundation upon which both state law and local education agency choice may add.
222. 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (2009).
223. Id. § 1401. Showing the wide boundaries of this term, the list includes, for example,
orientation and mobility services; recreation, including therapeutic recreation; school health services;
and parent counseling and training. Id.
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vention strategies.”224 Second, the “required . . . [for] benefit from special
education” element of the definition225 provides a necessity standard that
has proven to be a reasonable test226 for determining whether an individual child with a disability is entitled to a particular related service.227 This
necessity standard, which is keyed to the child’s special education
progress, is clearly an improvement over the current ad hoc, absent, or
incorrect standard practice among both hearing/review officers and
courts in the many states that do not specify the behavior-impeding
test.228 On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s approach of treating an
express behavior-impeding standard of access as merely procedural 229
and thus subject to the IDEA’s harmless-error approach for FAPE 230
would appear to run counter to the IDEA’s state-adding building block of
“cooperative federalism.”231 An access standard for an FBA or a BIP is
as much or more substantive as it is procedural, which is more directly a
matter of eligibility than FAPE.
In contrast, for “appropriateness,” the predominant but not universal approach232 of applying the Rowley standard of reasonably calculated
for educational benefit233 uses an available and time-tested standard that
is preferable to an ad hoc approach, which would be either lacking a specific standard or based on professional norms not adopted by legislation
224. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(10) (2009). Other separately defined illustrations include “counseling services,” “rehabilitation counseling,” and “social work services.” Id. §§ 300.23(c)(14),
300.34(c)(12), 300.343(c)(2). For the corresponding IDEA regulation, see 34 C.F.R § 300.34(a).
225. See supra text accompanying note 223.
226. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402.
227. See, e.g., DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. M.T.V., 164 F. App’x 900 (11th Cir. 2006) (ruling
that vision therapy was necessary for this student to benefit from special education); Sherman v.
Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 340 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (ruling that a TI-82 calculator rather
than the TI-92 was appropriate for a high school student with a specific learning disability in math);
M.K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Conn. 2008) (rejecting wraparound services as unnecessary
to the student’s progress); District of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2005) (ruling that door-to-door transportation, including aide, was necessary for this student to receive FAPE);
Aaron M. v. Yomtoob, 38 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (ruling that parent was entitled to six, not
twelve, trips per year for parent training at her child’s residential placement); Roslyn Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Univ. of the State of N.Y., 711 N.Y.S.2d 582 (App. Div. 2000) (ruling that transportation from extracurricular activity to home for this child was unnecessary for FAPE).
228. In the FBA and BIP rulings to date, it is not uncommon for hearing/review officers, and to
a lesser extent courts, to either misinterpret the IDEA or create a new behavior-impeding test. See
supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005); D.D. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 480
F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 777 (1st Cir. 2002).
230. See supra note 172.
231. See, e.g., Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 733–34 (2d Cir. 2007);
Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (recognizing that states may add requirements to the IDEA’s foundation).
232. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 163.
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or regulations. It is also preferable in the stead of the other extreme: the
Alex R. eviscerating approach, which leaves an FBA or a BIP as a potentially empty exercise unless the IDEA is amended or state laws fill the
gap.234
Finally, the present approach for evaluating an implementation
challenge to a BIP seems to be a fitting application of the more general
approach for such IEP and FAPE cases, which uses a standard of reasonable or equitable compliance rather than 100% compliance.235 Thus, absent an amendment to the IDEA, a more rigorous optimal standard is appropriately left to state law or local policy.236
In sum, this quantitative and qualitative analysis of the FBA and
BIP case law reveals the need for a more consistent and coherent approach to the access, appropriateness, and implementation issues of these
interrelated behavioral features of special education under the IDEA and
related state laws. Although the application must be adjudicated on an
individualized basis, the standards must be clearer and more consistent
based on the available and pertinent concepts of the IDEA. State laws
that incorporate higher standards similarly require more defensible adjudication with the separate desiderata of professional norms left to local
discretion to the extent that the next IDEA reauthorization and future
state laws do not expressly adopt them.

234. See Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004).
235. See supra note 186.
236. Parents have the alternative of resorting to the state’s complaint resolution process, which
tends to be more oriented toward strict compliance. See Zirkel & McGuire, supra note 12, at 104–05.

